# Securitization

### Alt - Forget IR Theory

#### The alternative is to forget---that escapes the vicious circle that gave rise to hegemonic practices. That enables a tabula rasa of the consciousness that offers opportunities to think and act beyond the confines of our desolate present.

Bleiker 1997 [Roland Bleiker; “Forget IR Theory” Bleiker teaches international relations, peace studies and political theory at the University of Queensland. Sage Publications, 1997 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/40644880 Accessed 7/22/22](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40644880%20Accessed%207/22/22) //jerry]

To forget orthodox IR theory is not to ignore the IR practices that have framed our realities. Countless events of the past, such as the Holocaust, cannot and should not be simply chased out of our collective memory. Nor is it to turn a blind eye toward the violent nature that characterizes present world politics. Forgetting is not only a negative process, a neglecting and overlooking, but also a **necessary part of our existence**, something we often do without being aware of it. Jeanette Winterson: They say that every snowflake is different. If that were true, how could we go on? How could we ever get up and off our knees? How could we ever recover from the wonder of it? By forgetting. We cannot keep in mind too many things. There is only the present and nothing to remember.5 The task, then, becomes one of turning forgetting from a selective, arbitrary, and unconscious constitution of things past into **an active, conscious, and more inclusive process**. Instead of perpetuating IR nostalgia, seeking comfort and security in the familiar interpretation of long-gone epochs, even if they are characterized by violence and insecurity, **conscious forgetting opens up possibilities for a dialogical understanding of our present and past.** It refuses to tie future possibilities to established forms of life. Rather than further entrenching current IR security dilemmas by **engaging with the orthodox discourse that continuously gives meaning to them,** forgetting tries to **escape the vicious circle by which these social practices serve to legitimize and objectivize the very discourses that have given rise to them.** Forgetting becomes an **instrument of dialogue and inclusion**; it **reorients** our memories, becomes active by turning into forge(t) and for(to)get. From this vantage point, forgetting is a process or remembering, or, seen from Milan Kundera's reversed perspective, "**remembering is a form of forgetting**." I will draw primarily upon the work of Friedrich Nietzsche to explore the process of forgetting orthodox IR theory. This is not to essentialize Nietzsche or render him heroic but to employ his work as a steppingstone, a source to provoke thought before it, too, has to be forgotten in order not to turn into a new orthodoxy. The process of forgetting, for Nietzsche, is a process of healing: Only now do I believe you healed: for healed is who forgot.7 Nietzsche ended up with this position by dealing with a set of methodological dilemmas similar to those I am trying to address in this article. The need to forget emerges from recognizing the problematic links that are commonly drawn between cause and effect. Such a duality, Nietzsche claims, probably never existed. We merely establish arbitrary links between things that we consider important, isolate a couple of pieces out of a continuum of complex and intertwined events. This is why it is futile to search for a causal origin in this web of human life and to think we could somehow ground a better world on this form of flawed insight. "How foolish it would be," Nietzsche claims, "to suppose that one only needs to point out this origin and this misty shroud of delusion in order to destroy the world that counts for real, so-called "reality. "8 Nietzsche's skepticism toward grounding critique in an investigation of the origins of things is important. It is one of the reasons why some consider his work as the conceptual turning point from modernity to postmodernity.9 Nietzsche's own words may explain best the importance of forgetting for a critique of orthodox IR: **Why is it that this thought comes back to me again and again and in ever more varied colours?** - that formerly, when investigators of knowledge sought out the origin of things they always believed they would discover something of incalculable significance for all later action and judgment, that they always presupposed, indeed, that the salvation of man must depend on insight into the ongins of things, but . . . The more insight we possess into an ongin the less significant does the ongin appear: while what is nearest to us, what is around us and in us, gradually begins to display colors and beauties and enigmas and riches of significance of which earlier mankind had not an inkling.10 By observing why Nietzsche ended up with this position, I will explore the "riches of significance" that **could emerge once we liberate IR theory from the compulsion to link the search for peace with exploring the origins of present dilemmas in world politics**. I will then retrace Nietzsche's next step, an engagement with what he calls "**active forgetfulness," a way of thinking that enables "a tabula rasa of the consciousness**," makes room for new things, new thoughts, new possibilities.11 My approach to forgetting IR theory will revolve primarily around issues of language: how they constrain and enable, **how they are part of a discursive form of domination and, at the same time, offer powerful opportunities to think and act beyond the narrow confines of our present world**. In that sense, my article deals with methodological concerns - with what conventionally is considered form rather than substance. Yet, the manner in which we approach, think, conceptualize, and formulate IR has a significant impact on how it is practiced. Language frames politics. Form turns into substance.

### L - Islamophobia

#### Islamophobia shapes US foreign policy. Notions of western superiority are a critical tool that drum up support for broader militarism

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KUMAR: Absolutely not. I think it is true that larger numbers of conservative voters are racist. They are racist not just in terms of their attitude towards Arabs and South Asians, but also to a whole host of other groups. So it's true that this idea sort of concentrated within those ranks. But in fact **Islamophobia is far more systemic than that**. That is to say, the idea of a Muslim enemy, the idea of a terrorist enemy is one that actually goes back a couple of decades but was brought to light after 9/11 by the political elite, by our political leaders. So in fact **it** **is built into the system of U.S. foreign policy** **in this country.** And to simply look at the far right and to ignore the fact that it has larger implications in terms of justifying U.S. foreign policy would be really to have only an incomplete picture of what is at work in this form of racism. DESVARIEUX: Okay. Let's talk about the mass media and how they depict Islam since 9/11. Can you describe for us how the mass media has depicted Islam? KUMAR: Well, basically, the trauma of 9/11, the fact that, you know, 3,000 Americans died meant that it enabled the U.S. media to actually draw on stereotypes that have been, you know, propped up by Hollywood, by the news media, and so on for a few decades before that. And that was the idea that these are crazy, irrational people. They are all apparently driven by Islam to violence. And so we should lock them up, we should be suspicious of them, we should detain them at airports, and so on and so forth. And so that's what you saw in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. And this show called 24, which your viewers may know, is--it's about a lot of things [incompr.] that it's about **justifying the building of a national security state** and **justifying practices like torture** and so on and so forth. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And also the story of the day, of course, is Syria, and everyone's attention is drawn to Syria. Can you describe for us just how does Islamophobia play a role in any of the arguments for intervention in Syria, really? KUMAR: Okay. It doesn't play a direct role in that. It is--the idea of humanitarianism has a long history in the United States. The idea that there are victims all over the world, that the U.S. government has then got to make war in order to, you know, somehow defend them, this goes back all the way to the Spanish-American war of 1898, which was supposed to be about rescuing Cubans. And similarly, you see these sorts of justifications given. You know, Vietnamese need to be defended. In Iraq, it was babies, apparently, who were being bayoneted in Kuwait, and therefore the U.S. needed to intervene and defeat Iraq in 1991. So this idea of humanitarianism has a long history within the foreign policy establishment. But what makes it particularly potent in this case is that after 9/11 what you see is the Bush administration **projecting this idea of clash of civilizations**, which is basically the notion that we in the West are democratic, we are rational, we are civilized, we are, you know, all things wonderful, and they in the East are barbaric, they're misogynistic, and so on and so forth, and therefore we have an obligation, what used to be called the white man's burden, to go off and rescue them. And so you see some of that language, which is the idea that Arabs cannot bring democracy by themselves, they cannot make change, and so we need to intervene. So **it's a combination** **both** **of the victim narrative, which has a long history,** **combined with this language of clash of civilizations.** DESVARIEUX: Okay. And how does this fit into domestic policy? How do they work Islamophobia into domestic policy? KUMAR: Right. I mean, the comparison I make in the book and that I'm actually working on in the next book is that the U.S. government, and U.S. imperialism in particular, **always needs an enemy**. That is, when there is no humanitarian cause, an enemy is an extremely useful way **to justify wars abroad**, **as well as the policing of dissent at home**. So, for instance, during the Cold War we had been menacing enemy of the Soviet Union, against whom both a hot and a Cold War had to be waged. And, of course, this justified, then, McCarthyism, because there's always a reflection of the external enemy inside, and these people have to be rounded up, blacklisted, and so on and so forth. So that's the logic back then, and, of course, it was entirely about a politics of fear. Today we have the same sort of thing. After 9/11, the war on terror comes into **being precisely about fighting endless wars.** Remember, back in 9/11 the Bush administration was going to start with Afghanistan, go to Iraq, and then Iran, Syria, and so on and so forth. It didn't work out that way. But **the idea was to drum up this fear of this menacing terrorist enemy**, which justified wars all over the world in order to gain the U.S.'s interest in [incompr.] particularly in the oil-rich region in the Middle East. You asked me about domestic politics. Always there was a reflection of the domestic in terms of the international threat. And so what you've seen is innocent Muslims--and often actually not even Muslims, people from the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, some of them Sikhs, some some of them Hindus, some of them Christians, and so on, being racially profiled because that is the logic that comes out of this. I have a whole chapter in the book about how the legal system has been reworked so as to justify things like indefinite detention, things like torture, things like deportation. And, frankly, the infiltration of agents into our schools, into my school, into colleges, and so forth. So, you know, **it's truly horrific the extent to which Muslim** **Americans and people who look Muslim have been demonized since 9/11.**

### L - Militarization/Expansionism

#### The 1ac is a politic of territorialization that perpetuates the logic of coloniality—carving out spaces of control and the desire for complete control and visibility is a key tool of statecraft that justifies the basis for continual acts of Islamophobic violence

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The world we live in is visualised in terms of a **geography** bequeathed to us by Early Modern and **Enlightenment cartography**, and established by the exercise of an Euroepan imperium and its construction of a **world order** of **metropolitian nation-states** and **colonies**. In this world system, primary and legitimate actors were European states organized around cultivation of core nationalities (French, British, Dutch…). The dismantling of the European colonial empires meant the idea of nation-states become global, but only few nationalities were considered to be epistemological privileged. These epistemological privileged states became the leading producers of knowledge. As Ramon Grofoguel points out the global cannon is based on work of writers from six European countries. Eurocentrism is simultaneously national, racial and global. Social relations that do not morph around the nation-state are marginal. Thus, a national/nationalist methodology elaborates social relations as being contained within boundaries of basically an Enlightenment cartography. By using the example of Muslims as a globalized population that is not contained within any nation-state, we will explore the continuities and discontinuities between social relations mediated through virtual space and social relations spatialized geographically. The spatial dimension of social relations has historically been conceived in terms of attempts to overcome distance. The range of social relations is contained by the ability to transcend space through the development of transportation and communications. The process of territorialisation describes the way in which organised human endeavour creates a container for the exercise of a myriad of social interactions.[5] The boundaries of this container are determined by the interplay between environment, logistical technologies and strategic awareness. Hunter-gather bands, agrarian villages, cultic associations, polities, trade routes and networks; construct a different form of territorialisation in which activity in the interior is marked as different in the expenditure of resources than activity in the exterior. Thus, space occurs as a void which needs to be overcome through **a web of social relations**, and this web is borne on an assemblage of **technologies of communications** and transportation (alphabetic scripts, organised commissariats, ocean-going vessels, railways etc.). Modes of transmission create territories by overcoming space.[6] In other words, human communities transform the spatial dimension of power into enclosed spaces (Buzan & Little, 2000). The spatial dimension of human interactions can be analysed not only through the **institution of the state**, but also through various forms of the **spatialization of power**, including the bounded experience of hunter-gatherer bands, nomads and other forms of human association. The staging of the political has a spatial dimension. The Spatial Turn This organisation of **space**, however, is **not merely a site** for the enactment of social relations but rather a **fundamental element in** **the** **constitution of "systems of interaction"** (Soja, 1980; Giddens, 1984, p. 368). Space, then, is not a description of the **physical surface** occupied by individuals, families, and communities; it is not just **terrain** for political struggles: palaces and assemblies, public squares, and sacred ground, containers for the **performance of** **social** **ontologies**, but rather the **condition of possibility for the exercise of power**. Physical space is **experienced** through **discursive spatialization** not simply as **a pre-existing immutable reality** that is simply a background to human activity. The exercise of power is not limited to the idea of a cyberpolitics in which cyberspace is conceptualized as a new distinctive arena of contestation where the struggle for “who gets what, when, and how”, takes place (Choucri, 2012, p. 4). This paper is concerned not with a cyberpolitics but rather with the political, in which, the exercise of power is constitutive of the social. **Space is not natural but historically and culturally contingent**, the product of **social interactions** which **restrain** and **enable behaviour and beliefs**. As Massey suggests that we understand space as: “Space” is created out of the vast intricacies, the incredible complexities, of the interlocking and the non-interlocking, and the networks of relations at every scale from local to global… all social (and indeed physical) phenomena/activities/relations have a spatial form and a relative spatial location” (Massey, 1992, p. 80). The spatial turn within the humanities and social sciences abandons the belief in space as a natural container in favour of investigations in the discursive articulation of space (Massey, 1992; Kosmin, 2014, pp. 5-6). The process by which land and sea were spatialized are so deeply sedimented that we can be forgiven experiencing them as part of a natural geological reality. It is for this reason that it is the introduction of the **spatialization of the skies after** the first world, which provides a useful analogy with the emergence of cyberspace.[7] Airpower and emergence of cyberspace In 1921, Giulio Douhet (2009), an Italian general published The Command of the Air. This book in its various editions, is considered to be the first significant theorisation of the air power. Douhet had served in the First World War with the Italian Army fighting the Austro-Hungarian forces, saw the potential for the use of warplanes as strategic rather than tactical weapons. In other words, he was critical of the way in which air planes had been used until then either for reconnaissance or as ‘flying artillery’ to attack small enemy formations in concert with ground forces (Douhet, 2009, p. 3). Instead, he argued that aeroplanes should be used in large ‘aerial fleets’ to attack enemy cities behind the front lines occupied by land forces (Douhet, 2009, p. 24). This strategic bombing would break the will of the enemy of population and modern war, which needed to mobilise a large percentage of its male citizenry, could not be sustained without popular support. Douhet’s call for independent air forces capable of bombing enemy cities into submission depended on his spatialization of the sky. That is, the sky became a surface of represention for the exercise of military engagement. The sky unlike the land provided a pure geometric plane. In which t aircraft could move in any direction; the sky was an even surface without physical constraints or means for channelling movement across it. Unlike armies, which are dependent on rail and road transport, or fleets which were only able to move through connected bodies of water of sufficient depth and scale, a mass formation of aeroplanes would have no such restrictions. It would be able to attack enemy infrastructure, industry and population centres without topographical hindrance. Douhet realized that the aeroplanes' ability to move across the sky at speed, would lead to the transformation of the battlefield. The distinction between civilians and soldiers would collapse, military action would no longer be restricted to the frontline where rival organised large armed units contend. Total wars would be fought by the total mobilisation of all the resources of society. The introduction of airpower would expand the battlefield so that it would embrace the entire length and breadth of the warring states, without any sheltered spaces where peaceful life could continue unaffected. Douhet’s theorisation of **air power**, saw the **spatialization of the sky** and the emergence of **total war** **as spatial and social phenomena**. The example of the way in which the sky was spatialized shows how **space is discursively articulated** and how such articulations have effects which are not merely **descriptive** but **constitutive**. By conceiving the sky as part of the **spatialization of the battlefield**, Douhet and other theoreticians of air power were instrumental in advocating **new institutional forms** (e.g. independent air forces), **new strategies** and **new conceptions of distance and threat**. The addition of air power to the land and sea war-fighting dimensions was not an **incremental** transformation but **revolutionary shift**, the influence of which went **beyond the sphere of war-making.** Airpower transformed the idea of territorial circumspection which had been central to the development of early modern states in Eurasia. By spatializing the skies, the state becomes a three-dimensional entity. The demarcation and regulation of the skies, expanded the range of operations of the state. The sky was not simply **medium** for the exercise of air power; **it** **becomes** **part of the** **discursive activity of statecraft, i.e. the continuous efforts necessary for making and maintaining a state** (Devetak, 1995, pp. 31-33) The discourses of around cyberspace, are often constituted in opposition to the authority of state (e.g. phenomenon of hacktivism). The liberalism in the imaginaries of cyberspace has several implications for the analysis of Islamophobia in Cyberia. Imaginaries of Cyberspace By conceptualising Cyberia not as a medium but as **space**, it allows us to present the problem of Islamophobia not [as] the politics of representation but rather as **the** **formation of a political order**. Spatial imaginaries in the West find it very difficult to evade the lure of Orientalism. The various representations of cyberspace demonstrate the way in which the **spatial** **in different forms** was articulated by tropes culled from the history of **Orientalist imaginings**. Descriptions of the meaning of cyberspace have reflected broader cultural disposition among Western plutocracies about the relationship between technology and humanity. Such articulations have significance for the **Western enterprise**, since, **technological reasoning** has been **one main marker** by which the West **differentiated** itself from the Rest. An approach which technology which saw in a positive light has been tempered by the realization that technology may undermine the human. The Western cultures also identified themselves as being societies in which the human could be the most humane. Thus, the tension between technology and humanity had a resonance in Western societies. This tension between technological and the human are reflected in main interpretations of the meaning of cyberspace. A complex set of interpretations can be summarized for our purposes as a dialectic between the potential of cyberspace to deliver totalitarianism or liberation. This dialectic can be seen in the shifts in perception about the internet in recent years. The early hopes for the cyberspace were that it would constitute a new global republic in which dense communications across national boundaries would further deepen the development of global civil society able to check the arbitrary authority of nation-states. The fantasy of Athenian polis informed some of these accounts. This fantasy was strengthened by the way in which it aligned with liberal beliefs in individuals bound by rational conversations able to transcend all accretions of culture, religion, ideology and the exercise of autonomy. The collapse in distance transformed the problem of scale: it allowed for the exposing the idea of minorities as an accounting exercise rather than actualities. In other, words minorities were disclosed as an effect of boundary drawing. Boundaries which cyberspace had the potential to unravel. This is often presented as compression of time-space: the world becoming smaller, but it could as easily be conceived as the expansion of our world. The range of intimacies become bound by a conception of proximity that was global. Everyone could be local. This localisation seemed to make it possible to see the internet as a democratic space, outside the control of any Leviathan. In this view, ‘a wild west motif’ signified cyberspace as a place of freedom were ‘hacktivists' emerge as the vanguard of the ‘anti-globalization movement (Jordan & Taylor, 2004, p. 33).[8] Rather than information technologies being used to deliver a totalitarianism, there is this view of cyberspace was a site where it was possible to resist globalisation, commodification and homogenization. The vision of cyberspace as a country t anti-Leviathan, however, was checked by the revelations of Wiki-leaks. Wiki-leaks, seemed to demonstrate that the idea that Big Brother was not watching us, or rather that the belief that in Cyberspace there was no possibility of a Big Brother was a naive at best and at worst delusional. It was clear that the United States and some of its allies forced the private co-operations who peddled the dream of individual freedom as being the defining feature of the internet to create a crypto-infrastructure of surveillance and regulation. Cyberia was only a Hollywood version of the ancient Greek polis, which completely ignored the exclusionary nature of the Greek conception of democracy, as well as for polities like Sparta- apartheid states where the equality of the Herrenvolk was maintained by systematic torture and oppression of the helot masses. Big Brother was watching us, but he was just less bombastic about it, and like the citizens of Oceania we did not have the imagination to understand our circumstances. The investigations associated with wiki-leaks seemed re-insert cyberspace into a familiar narrative of state formation and resistance. The ability of the state to exercise power and regulate and discipline its population was circumscribed by **topography**.[9] One of the claims made on behalf of digitalisation was that it would overcome topography. Wiki-leaks provided evidence that under surface of the vision of the internet as free space open to all forms of creativity and beyond the reach of political authority, powerful states had begun to establish mechanisms for exerting their control over cyberspace. Cyberspace was more centralized than it was believed. Traditionally, centralization was a key feature of the state. Territorial centralisation; however, meant that the remit of a central political authority was unevenly distributed among different social sectors and spaces. Upland and densely forested regions were often able to become a refuge for outsiders often described as ‘bandits’ (from the point of view of the state). The gradual replacement of welfare liberal democracies by national surveillance plutocracies demonstrates the way in which state expansion has carried out a granular colonisation of life-worlds. The virtual monopolies some of the American companies came to exercise over the internet, also suggested Big Brother may exist not as a state actor but as a corporate chief executive. The idea of cyberspace as an engine of human emancipation and expression became undermined by the way in which strucutres of the internet were increasingly configured for profit maximisation and thus were able to channel and commodify individual creativity. This dialectic between centralising force of the state and emancipatory force of hacktivism reproduces at the level of cyberspace, the logic of liberalism. Liberalism is not a just a political creed, but rather a family of philosophical orientations which enjoy hegemonic global status. What unites liberalism is a set of commitments which foreground rationalism, and individualism as being the core building blocks of social formations and interactions. The primacy of the rational individual disavows the role of antagonism in the formation of identities and believes that the political can be domesticated by the exercise of rational debate (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 10-11). Liberalism fails to recognise itself as being political– that is borne out of conflict and does not recognise its history that has been compatible with racialised authoritarianism. Three of the countries who are seen as representatives of liberalism where racial states (the British Empire, the French Empire and the United States). As several studies have demonstrated liberalism belief in the limited role of the state, and the rights of the individual were compatible with racial-colonial rule (Sayyid, 2014, pp. 17-29), Western colonial rule was not a contradiction of liberalism but is validation (Mehta, 1999). The emergence of racism in its various iterations including Islamophobia in cyberspace does not belie the logic of liberalism, rather it one of the gateways to the establishment of racial order in cyberspace. The question is how to account for the way in which the republic of cyberspace has become infused with Islamophobia. Islamophobia circulates not because they are organisations and individuals who are able to share their hostility towards Muslims in the physical sphere in Cyberia. Islamophobia in cyberspace is not a shadow or parallel to the existence of antagonism towards the Islamicate in the ‘real’ world. **Islamophobia arises from** **the** **discursive articulation of** Cyberia as **space**. To make good on this claim I want to draw attention to the work being done on the republic of letters (e.g. Goodman, 1994; Al-Musawi, 2015). The republic of letters is a better-suited analogy to the cyberspace than that which sees the advent of the internet as an enhanced media platform "The republic of letters was an intellectual network" (Goodman, 1994, pp. 14-15) enabled by the technologies of the printing press and postal system that came to occupy a central position in the constitution of the public sphere in France from the 17th century onwards.[10] The Enlightenment republic of letters was centred in France, but the network it generated began to connect European men of letters, academic institutions, salons and periodicals, beyond the borders of the French monarchy. These physically dispersed men of letters developed a consciousness that they constituted a distinct political community that was cosmopolitan in its orientation. The web that bound the republic of letters was woven through an “epistolary commerce” (Goodman, 1994, p. 17), which established the standing of its citizens and contribute their social capital. The republic of letters was bound not by common ideas as such but rather the circulation of correspondence which forged a sense of dispersed and fragmented sociability. Many of the participants of in the Enlightenment republic of letters were involved in theorizing and advocating colonial-racial domination. The trans-national (or to be more precise the trans-polity) republic of letters was instrumental in forging white supremacy as a global enterprise. It allowed for the possibility of Europeaness when confronted with non-Europeaness to transcend its internal rivalries and erect a colour line that held firm until the carnage of First World War (1914-1918) and October revolution of 1917. Islamophobia has emerged as means of restoring white supremacy in an increasingly post-Western world order. Cyberspace is one domain where the post-Western diversity of the planet has yet to penetrate. It is a space where white privilege is still hegemonic. This hegemony is arising not merely from the frequency of circulation of Islamophobic memes but also the structure of cyberspace that is akin to a republic of letters. **A new world order has been established around the logic of the “war on terror”.** Central to this order is the **regulation** and **subordination of** **expressions of** **Muslimness**. The emergence of parts of cyberspace as Islamophobic republic of letters is due to three main factors which have changed the international order. Firstly, the end of the Cold War meant not only the end of the possibility of a Soviet/communist alternative to Western/capitalist hegemony, but it also dismantled the very idea of the “Third World”. The Third World was not only a geopolitical category in which it was possible for issues of concern to the global South to gain leverage by skilful manoeuvring between US-led camp and Soviet camp. It was also aphilosophical and cultural base from which to launch an epistemological challenge to the enduring Eurocentrism. The Third World provided an transnational infrastructure of resistance and included men and women not only from the ex-colonies but also, to , some extentfrom the ranks of the marginalized and dispossessed in the developed world. The convergence of anti-colonial struggles with anti-racist struggles (pioneered by civil rights in the U.S)., was crucial. The critique of Orientalism was enabled by existence of these networks and associations which organized around the Third World (Sayyid, 2016). This abandonment of a possible alternative to Western hegemony empowered the belief that the universal was wrapped in the clothes of Europeaness. The end of the Soviet alternative however, can be seen philosophically as part of the de-centring of the West, since even the Soviet Union was a geopolitical rival at deeper cultural and philosophical level it is considered to be part of the heritage of the European enlightenment. The apparent victory in the Cold War only exposed the way in which the world was becoming post-Western, that is, a world in which colonial-racial order was eroding. This leads to the second factor is that **Western** **elites** **have not emotionally adapted to the post-Western world.** This is why, so many of them have rushed to embrace policies that seek **colonial solutions** to what are **postcolonial predicaments**. Thus, the antagonism towards Islam and Muslims is a means of shoring up the West’s sense of its own destiny. The choice of Islam and Muslim as the antagonistic-other, i.e. as the figure that subsumes the traumatic kernel that prevents the West from being a fully realized harmonious and prosperous whole, is not purely arbitrary. **The figure of the Muslim** encompasses all the attributes of what the West likes to think it is not: **misogynist**, **racist**, **violent** etc. That is, **Western narratives** of **itself** are reliant on articulating the Muslim as the figure which represents the very **impossibility of the West** being equal to itself. The incapability of the West to live up to its own version of what it should be is explained by the scandal of the Muslim presence– both geographically and temporally (Sayyid, 2016). The crisis of social cohesion in the West has become explicable by reference to the existence of a Muslim presence which prevents the full closure of these societies around core liberal values. The failure of liberal values is externalized to the surface of Muslim bodies rather than something intrinsic to liberalism itself.[11] This externalization cannot cause but bewilderment, grief, and unsettlement as well as resistance from Muslims. **At the heart of Islamophobia was an anxiety about the loss of white privilege**.

#### Expansion of militarization rest on an Islamophobic attitude that makes violence and cultural racism more likely

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2. Islamophobia and the Clash of Civilizations Thesis The shift towards Islamophobia and using the Muslim subject as the singular global strategic threat emerged towards the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even though a case can be made that the 1979 Iranian Revolution intensified the negative representation of Islam and Muslims in the West, particularly in the US, nevertheless, the scope of the demonization was not on the same scale that emerged in the post-Cold War era. In the UK context, the appearance of Islamophobia as a concept into the public policy can be traced to the Iranian revolution and the Salman Rushdie affair, which brought an intense focus on the Muslim community due to the perceived or real support for the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s fatwa¯ calling for Rushdie’s assassination. Certainly, the political leadership and the media discourses at the time were filled with anti-Muslim rhetoric and drawing a distinction between Iran (representing a feared aspect of Islam) and the West. It is not surprising that Edward Said’s book, Covering Islam, was written to explore the media demonization of Islam and Muslims after the 1979 Iranian Revolution (Said 1997). On the other hand, Said’s Orientalism navigated the long history of representations, scholarly writing, and stereotyping that often served as a stable source material for the reproduction of Arab and Muslim otherization (Said 1979). The anti-Iranian and anti-Shia discourses in the Western and Arab press were balanced at the time with constructing a favorable view of the Sunni Afghan Mujhadeen, who had an important strategic function in confronting and bleeding the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (Dreyfuss 2005). Thus, a certain Sunni Jihadi worldview was incubated in the US and Europe that supported, on the one hand, the war in Afghanistan and on the other a readiness to oppose and confront the Iranian revolution, the pretext of defending the eastern gate of the Arab world from the Iranian Shia expansion. This means that between 1979 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Islamophobia was given a localized and distinct Religions 2018, 9, 282 5 of 13 anti-Shia aim rather than being an all-encompassing strategy to demonize Islam or Muslims as a single category. Importantly, the focus shifted on the “Dual Containment” in the US foreign policy, a policy fixed on countering the Arab Nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism, which included targeting Iran for the Shia revolution and the nationalist Palestine Liberation Organization, Libya, as well as Iraq until it joined the Arab and Western strategy to reverse, counter, and bleed the Iranian Revolution. In this period, the “Islamic threat” specifically meant the Iranian Shia threat and “our” allies were the Sunni Jihadi fundamentalists which encompassed the full spectrum of Sunni oriented groups and sects. Navigating this strategy required a careful cultivation of alliances and constructing a narrative that would resonate and enable the Sunni majority governments to mobilize their intelligence agencies to recruit individuals to participate in the two-front war, the Afghan war against the Russians, and on the Iraqi front opposing Iran. In both cases, the construction of the Sunni Jihadi Islam was the needed “religious” tonic to bring forth foot soldiers into the battlefields in the thousands and unbeknown to then assist the US, Europe, and the Arab and Muslim states in implementing the containment strategy. The Iran-Iraq war involved a different level of complexity for US foreign policy and followed a balancing strategy centering on containment of both parties and preventing a clear victor from emerging. Arab Nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism, which in the 1980s referred mainly to Iran, formed US’s Dual-Containment policy and translated into supporting the party that was losing the war and maintaining the balance of power between them and cause a drain [to] their strategic resources. Containment is to cause the diversion of resources wherever possible away from being deployed against the US, Israel and any other regional allies. Thus, Dual-Containment explains the US’s readiness to work with Israel to supply Iran with missiles, a policy was subject to a congressional hearing and became known as the Iran-Contra Affair. The watershed moment for the emergence of Islamophobia, an all-encompassing and undifferentiated in terms of sect and group, is directly connected to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the immediate outcome of the 1st Gulf War, and the Palestinian uprising which provided the stage for problematizing Islam and Muslims as a single threatening subject. The Islamic groups, sects, and organizations played an important role during the Cold War by providing a counter and indigenously framed religious epistemic to counter socialism, communism, and self-determination oriented nationalism, which has proven to be a very successful strategy. However, the end of the Cold War and the shifts into a unipolar world produced contestation and a race at home and abroad to define the emerging “new world order” but, more importantly, a pursuit of opportunities to reshape the US military and economic priorities in the new era. During this period and post-Cold War, Muslims and Islam become an otherized category in the U.S. with multipronged levels of exclusion and forms of racialized discrimination inflicted upon individuals and groups. The othering process directed at Muslims was unleashed by the political elites that wanted to craft a strategy to contest and maintain power in the post-Cold War, which included a heavy emphasis on the massive military expenditures, which might had been cut after the defeat of the Soviet Union. As the red “evil empire” came to an end, the machinery for crafting a green menace took shape in the form of Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis, which provided the needed shift and the use of cultural racism as the basis for differentiation and hostility. Using cultural racism as the basis for the “Clash of Civilization” thesis is the rebranding of the pre-WWII des-credited biological racism and is offered as a signpost for the same sets of racist attitudes and perspectives that were deployed in the earlier biological version. In this context, Islamophobia is less about Islam or even about Muslims themselves, their lives and hopes but more about the unsureness of the Western societies as a whole. The Cold War created a common framework and presented the “us” as the good side fighting collectively against “them”, the communists who represented the evil but the question was what to do afterward and what was the path forward. Targeting Islam and Muslims is the way to define politics, culture, economy, religion, and identity in the post-Cold War period. By magnifying the differences and then transforming them into an existential threat in the mind of the US and Western public, the forging of a fictitious Religions 2018, 9, 282 6 of 13 sense of patriotic unity and purpose is possibly actualized. The U.S. political elites who were suckled on confronting the “evil empire” emerged less confident and unsure about the present and future considering all the global political, economic, and social changes that unfolded rapidly. The use of Islamophobia and demonization of Islam and Muslims serves the perfect diversion for populists politicians who have no real vision for the future and are able to monetize fear to slither their way into seats of power with venomous rhetoric promising restoration and greatness

### L - Terrorism

#### The AFFs fear of terrorism is driven by the islamophobia industry consisted of neo-conservative logic that waged countless pointless wars – be skeptical of their ‘truth claims’ because they are a product of special interests that sustain the US hegemony security apparatus that arbitrarily creates proxy wars for their own existence

Tony **Cartalucci 16**. “ISIS Serves US Foreign Policy: « Islamophobia » Industry Feeds War Abroad, Grows Police State at Home”, Mondialisation, March 26, https://www.mondialisation.ca/isis-serves-us-foreign-policy-islamophobia-industry-feeds-war-abroad-grows-police-state-at-home/5516695

It’s real simple. **Create a threat**, predicate expanding autocracy at home and **endless wars of hegemony abroad** upon confronting that threat, and all the while intentionally perpetuate **fear**, **hysteria**, **hatred**, and **division** to keep that threat relevant in the hearts and minds of as many people as possible. Described above is an elementary tactic used by **special interests** throughout human history, and today’s special interests being no exception. Today, the contrived threat of choice is « **terrorism**. » It is a well-documented fact that organizations like Al Qaeda and the so-called « Islamic State » (ISIS), are **creations and geopolitical** **tools of the United** **States**, its European allies, and its Middle Eastern subordinates, including Turkey and the Persian Gulf states. The means of keeping this contrived threat fresh in the minds of the public is Islamophobia – **the** **scapegoating of** **some** **1.6** **billion Muslims around the world** **for the deeds of US-Saudi indoctrinated, armed, funded, and backed extremists**. The role the United States and Saudi Arabia played in the inception of Al Qaeda during the 1980’s to wage proxy war on the Soviet Union in Afghanistan is documented history. What is less widely known, is the role these same two nations played in the creation of ISIS -which admittedly branched off from Al Qaeda. However, America’s own Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) **admitted** **in a leaked 2012 memo that indeed, just as** **Al Qaeda was created to wage proxy war in Afghanistan**, a « Salafist » (**Islamic**) « principality » (**State**) **was** **intentionally created in** **eastern** **Syria to wage proxy war against Damascus**. The leaked 2012 report (.pdf) stated explicitly that: If the situation unravels there is the possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared Salafist principality in eastern Syria (Hasaka and Der Zor), and this is exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition want, in order to isolate the Syrian regime, which is considered the strategic depth of the Shia expansion (Iraq and Iran). To clarify just who these « supporting powers » were that sought the creation of a « Salafist » (Islamic) principality » (State), the DIA report explains: The West, Gulf countries, and Turkey support the opposition; while Russia, China, and Iran support the regime. It is clear then, that if the US and its allies are behind ISIS, then attacks attributed to ISIS are either directly or indirectly related to US foreign policy. It is very clear that **ISIS serves Western objectives** **in the Middle East and North Africa region** (MENA) **by waging war against precisely those governments the US** **itself** **has slated for** « regime change. » **ISIS** **also** **serves as a convenient pretext for direct military intervention abroad when possible**. What may be less clear to some, is what the US and its allies have to gain when ISIS launches attacks in France, Belgium, and other targets across both East and West. However, it is indeed clear – clear that **they serve to bolster the contrived threat of « global terrorism »** **and both the growing autocracy at home and expanding wars abroad**, Islamophobia Industry Run by Familiar Faces Wouldn’t it be curious if those most vocal in promoting fear, hysteria, hatred, and division against Muslims to perpetuate the contrived threat of « global terrorism » represented the **same special interests** **both** **involved directly in arming, funding, training, and exploiting the violence of terrorist groups** like Al Qaeda and ISIS, as well as the same special interests **profiting the most from the** **perpetual «** **War on Terror?** » It would be curious – and **it** **also** **happens to be the verified truth**. A growing ecosystem of Islamophobia networks is **centered around** **a cadre of** **Neo-Conservatives who led the United** **States** **into** **the** **Afghanistan** **and** **Iraq** **wars**, as well as advocated for wars against **Iran**, **Libya**, **Syria**, **Sudan**, and many more in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in Washington, New York, and Pennsylvania. One of the highest level former US government representatives publicly involved, John Bolton, was a vocal advocate for global war including in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, and Iran, and has for years served as the **gravitational center of** **at least** **America’s Islamophobia subsidiary**. Around him orbits media personality, racist, bigot Pam Geller, Robert Spencer, and Project for a New American Century (PNAC) signatory, Daniel Pipes.

#### The plan plays into the Islamophobic racial capitalist terror-industrial complex

**Rana 16** – Associate Professor of Asian American Studies at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign and Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from the University of Texas (Junaid, “The Racial Infrastructure of the Terror-Industrial Complex”, Social Text 129, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 111-138, https://read.dukeupress.edu/social-text/article/34/4%20(129)/111/31152/The-Racial-Infrastructure-of-the-Terror-Industrial, December 2016)

The scene Powell portrays situates mainstream American Christianity with an assumed other of Hinduism, and a notable avoidance of any direct reference to Islam, with a now familiar exhortation of the exceptionalism of the United States. And this may be the point: **one does not need to mention Islam** to use the dog-whistle terms that imply Muslims in the War on Terror. That there is a fear of a few “dangerous” elements threatening the “survival” of the entire system betrays a deeper issue at hand. Powell’s description contains an implicit assumption that Islam is a ubiquitous category of other that need not be named for it to lurk otherwise in the thoughts of readers. This of course is an accepted conceit of the post-9/11 world, in which the War on Terror has created a media subtext of any and all forms of terror. Earlier in the interview Powell used the pronoun they to describe “terrorists” in comparing the “American way of life” as stronger than threats of death and the destruction of property, again the presumption that war and violence are already givens in the landscape of the democratic future of the United States. The dangerous elements in Brooklyn and New Jersey that Powell referred to are an evocative object, one that names something without specifics and in a language that is understood as a proliferation of unending possibility. Like Eisenhower’s famous warning of a military-industrial complex in 1961, Powell raises this issue of a terror-industrial complex somewhat in passing to tout a sense of American superiority—a “we are better than this” sort of mentality that situates the democratic political system as the highest form of collective decision making and prosperity. For much of the mainstream media at the time, the mention of the terror-industrial complex failed to make an impact. In large part this warning from Powell was a side conversation to the lead of the story. In this same interview Powell issued an apology, admitting that he had made a mistake in reporting to the United Nations that the US government had information regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The reference to the terror-industrial complex stayed buried until 2009, when Keith Olbermann of MSNBC broadcast a video interview with Colin Powell from 2007. Here campus journalists from the University of Oklahoma newspaper the Oklahoma Daily had asked him to expand on the idea shortly after he made his original statement. Powell responded by elaborating his description of the concept of the **terror-industrial complex** as follows: We’re spending an enormous amount of money on Homeland Security. And I think we should spend whatever it takes. But I think we have to be careful that we don’t get so caught up in trying to throw money at the terrorist and counter-terrorist problem that we essentially are creating an industry that will only exist as long as you keep the terrorist threat pumped up. . . . We spend a lot of money to put a lot of equipment out there, kind of terrorism equipment. But now we need more money to keep that equipment running. Well, let’s make sure that what we have sent out there is absolutely essential. And let’s be cautious in our appropriations and in spending money. I don’t think we’re out of control, I think we had to respond in an aggressive way. But it’s now been six years. Let’s make sure we’re spending money on the right things, and not spending money just to spend money.2 This unusual admission of spending on the “terrorist and counterterrorist problem” is wrapped in the standard conservative discourse of fiscal restraint and government downsizing. Powell makes apparent that the term terror-industrial complex describes a relationship with money, or financial capital, in which the **threat of terrorism supersedes** **actually existing** **danger**, in other words, spending money in the aims of gaining an upper hand in a security situation that requires an adept military industry. In a similar vein, James Risen has recently called this formation the Homeland Security–industrial complex to reference the proliferation of companies seeking military contracts to provide the infrastructure of the Global War on Terrorism.3 In making a distinction from the military-industrial complex, Risen describes this system thus: “The new homeland security-complex operates differently. It is largely made up of a web of intelligence agencies and their contractors, companies that mostly provide secret services rather than large weapons systems and equipment. These contractors are hired to help Washington determine the scale and scope of the terrorist threat; **they make no money if they determine that the threat is overblown** or, God forbid, if the war on terror ever comes to an end.”4 Risen refers to details shared by these conceptual approaches through an explicit mandate through independent contractors while also highlighting a temporal frame of the security obsession with terror. This system that is so concerned with combating terrorism is indeed premised on a fundamental shift in military combat that reimagines the terms of war and the notion of an enemy. Propagating this in terms of a future sense of permanence and fixity, there is a financial interest for those who predict terrorism in such static terms. In other words, this is a system of **war with no end**, and the **fulfillment of** **a system of** **racial capitalism** that I describe as racial infrastructure. Infrastructure in the Marxist usage refers to the means of production and the category of class, or what might be referred to more generally as economic and social position. While infrastructure connotes the basic physical and organizational facilities from which society or a social system operates, I am here referring to racial infrastructure as a **spatial formation** in which the social, political, and economic relationships of racial systems operate through dominance and discursive power. What I find instructive in the examples used by Risen and a range of reportage on the post-9/11 security state and the War on Terror is the **unspoken racialization** of terror with Islam and Muslims.5 Certainly, Risen and others are critical of how the War on Terror fixates on Islam through an oversimplified syllogism that equates Muslims with terrorism, yet as I argue in what follows, the impact of the terror-industrial complex is far more extreme than a representational mistake based in the fearmongering of Islam and Muslims. Rather, it is the **larger** **systems** of structural violence that are normalized through the workings of concepts such as race and permanent war that create an unprecedented flexibility in the workings of social domination and capital accumulation. As an ideological structure it is present in a range of security and biopolitical technologies, including, for example, policing, health care, social services, and the framing of criminality and illegality in the detention and deportation regime. Whereas the military-industrial complex conjoined national military and political forces with the arms industry, the shift toward the private sector to conduct military and intelligence operations is part of the transition into the twenty-first-century development of the terror-industrial complex and what others such as Risen refer to in terms of security. Although the concomitant or analogous construction to terror in this sense is security, a concept that has often been used in political theory, I prefer to think through these conjoined forces using the notion of terror. Security is certainly an important ideological piece of how the terror-industrial complex is deployed, alongside other representations of state power such as surveillance. However, terror also indicates the **shift from institutions of power to amorphous ideas** so endemic in the rubrics of the War on Terror.6 The terror-industrial complex has dramatically shaped and altered social life across geographic locations with dramatic differences in scale. The wide-ranging escalation of structural and physical violence through war include, for example, the use of drones in targeted assassination and surveillance of social life, the everyday conditions of military occupation through means of war and governance, domestic and foreign mass surveillance, the militarization of policing domestically, and the use of surveillance and intelligence gathering by local law enforcement in collaboration or modeled after domestic and international spying agencies. Recent scholarship has begun to chip away at these deep transformations to social life that are guided by the racialization of Islam and Muslims.7 It is in this sense that, while the Obama administration no longer uses the specific term War on Terror to describe what rapidly developed under the Bush years after 9/11, the expansion of the security and surveillance state has brought the enormous apparatus of the terror-industrial complex into full bloom.

#### Their discourse of terrorism is a meaningless term used to propagate western imperial and neo-colonial regimes.

**Greenwald 15**, Glenn Greenwald, journalist, constitutional lawyer, and author of a New York Times best seller on politics and law, “Refusal to Call Charleston Shootings “Terrorism” Again Shows It’s a Meaningless Propaganda Term,” The Intercept, June 19, 2015, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/06/19/refusal-call-charleston-shootings-terrorism-shows-meaningless-propaganda-term/ // MAC

In February 2010, a man named Joseph Stack deliberately flew his small airplane into the side of a building that housed a regional IRS office in Austin, Texas, just as 200 agency employees were starting their workday. Along with himself, Stack killed an IRS manager and injured 13 others. Stack was an anti-tax, anti-government fanatic, and chose his target for exclusively political reasons. He left behind a lengthy manifesto cogently setting forth his largely libertarian political views (along with, as I wrote at the time, some anti-capitalist grievances shared by the left, such as “rage over bailouts, the suffering of America’s poor, and the pilfering of the middle class by a corrupt economic elite and their government-servants”; Stack’s long note ended: “the communist creed: From each according to his ability, to each according to his need. The capitalist creed: From each according to his gullibility, to each according to his greed”). About Stack’s political grievances, his manifesto declared that “violence not only is the answer, it is the only answer.” The attack had all of the elements of iconic terrorism, a model for how it’s most commonly understood: down to flying a plane into the side of a building. **But Stack was white and non-Muslim. As a result, not only was the word “terrorism” not applied to Stack, but it was** **explicitly declared inapplicable** **by media outlets and government officials alike.** The New York Times’s report on the incident stated that while the attack “initially inspired fears of a terrorist attack” — before the identity of the pilot was known — now “in place of the typical portrait of a terrorist driven by ideology, Mr. Stack was described as generally easygoing, a talented amateur musician with marital troubles and a maddening grudge against the tax authorities.” As a result, said the Paper of Record, “officials ruled out any connection to terrorist groups or causes.” And “federal officials emphasized the same message, describing the case as a criminal inquiry.” Even when U.S. Muslim groups called for the incident to be declared “terrorism,” the FBI continued to insist it “was handling the case ‘as a criminal matter of an assault on a federal officer’ and that it was not being considered as an act of terror.” By very stark contrast, consider the October 2014, shooting in Ottawa by a single individual, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, at the Canadian Parliament building. As soon as it was known that the shooter was a convert to Islam, the incident was instantly and universally declared to be “terrorism.” Less than 24 hours afterward, Prime Minister Stephen Harper declared it a terror attack and even demanded new “counter-terrorism” powers in its name (which he has now obtained). To bolster the label, the government claimed Zehaf-Bibeau was on his way to Syria to fight with jihadists, and the media trumpeted this “fact.” In his address to the nation the day after the shooting, Harper vowed to learn more about the “terrorist and any accomplices he may have had” and intoned: “This is a grim reminder that Canada is not immune to the types of terrorist attacks we have seen elsewhere around the world.” Twitter users around the world en masse used the hashtag of solidarity reserved (for some reason) only for cities attacked by a Muslim (but not cities attacked by their own governments): #OttawaStrong. In sum, that this was a “terror attack” was mandated conventional wisdom before anything was known other than the Muslim identity of the perpetrator. As it turns out, other than the fact that the perpetrator was Muslim and was aiming his violence at Westerners, almost nothing about this attack had the classic hallmarks of “terrorism.” In the days and weeks that followed, it became clear that Zehaf-Bibeau suffered from serious mental illness and “seemed to have become mentally unstable.” He had a history of arrests for petty offenses and had received psychiatric treatment. His friends recall him expressing no real political views but instead claiming he was possessed by the devil. The Canadian government was ultimately forced to admit that their prior media claim about him preparing to go to Syria was totally false, dismissing it as “a mistake.” Now that Canadians know the truth about him — rather than the mere fact that he’s Muslim and committed violence — a plurality no longer believe the “terrorist” label applies, but believe the attack was motivated by mental illness. The term “terrorist” got instantly applied by know-nothings for one reason: he was Muslim and had committed violence, and that, in the post-9/11 West, is more or less the only working definition of the term (in the rare cases when it is applied to non-Muslims these days, it’s typically applied to minorities engaged in acts that have no resemblance to what people usually think of when they hear the term). That is the crucial backdrop for yesterday’s debate over whether the term “terrorism” applies to the heinous shooting by a white nationalist of nine African-Americans praying in a predominantly black church in Charleston, South Carolina. Almost immediately, news reports indicated there was “no sign of terrorism” — by which they meant: it does not appear that the shooter is Muslim. Yet other than the perpetrator’s non-Muslim identity, the Charleston attack from the start had the indicia of what is commonly understood to be “terrorism.” Specifically, the suspected shooter was clearly a vehement racist who told witnesses at the church that he was acting out of racial hatred and a desire to force African-Americans “to go.” His violence was the byproduct of and was intended to publicize and forward his warped political agenda, and was clearly designed to terrorize the community he hates. That’s why **so many** **African-American and Muslim commentators and activists** **insisted** **that the term “terrorist” be applied: because it looked, felt and smelled exactly like other acts that are instantly branded “terrorism” when the perpetrator is Muslim and the victims largely white.** It was very hard — and still is — to escape the conclusion that the term “terrorism,” at least as it’s predominantly used in the post-9/11 West, is about the identity of those committing the violence and the identity of the targets. **It manifestly has nothing to do with some neutral, objective assessment of the acts being labelled.** The point here is not, as some very confused commentators suggested, to seek an expansion of the term “terrorism” beyond its current application. As someone who has spent the last decade more or less exclusively devoted to documenting the abuses and manipulations that term enables, the last thing I want is an expansion of its application. But what I also don’t want is for non-Muslims to rest in their privileged nest, satisfied that the term and its accompanying abuses is only for that marginalized group. And what I especially don’t want is to have this glaring, damaging mythology persist that the term “terrorism” is some sort of objectively discernible, consistently applied designation of a particularly hideous kind of violence. **I’m eager to have the term recognized for what it is:** **a** **completely malleable, manipulated, vapid** **term of propaganda** **that has no consistent application whatsoever.** Recognition of that reality is vital to draining the term of its potency. **The examples proving the utter malleability of the term “terrorism” are far too numerous to chronicle here. But over the past decade alone,** **it’s been used by Western political and media figures to condemn Muslims** **who used** **violence against an invading and occupying** **force in Afghanistan, against others who** **raised funds to help Iraqis** **fight against an invading and occupying military in their country, and for others who attack** **soldiers in an army that is fighting many wars.** In other words, any violence by Muslims against the West is inherently “terrorism,” even if targeted only at soldiers at war and/or designed to resist invasion and occupation. By stark contrast, no violence by the West against Muslims can possibly be “terrorism,” n

### Islamophobia Impact

#### The attempt to eradicate Islam is inherently discriminatory against Muslims – it creates a self fulfilling prophecy recreating the extremist threat

Farhadi 20, - Adib Farhadi is an assistant professor at University of South Florida and coordinator of USF's Executive Education Program. August 6 2020 “Countering Violent Extremism by Winning Hearts and Minds” https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-030-50057-3.pdf, Accessed 7-19-2022, LASA-BF)

Ever since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, in which Islamic violent extremists killedthousands of Americans and caused billions of dollars in damage on US soil, American political and popular discourse has treated radical Islam, Islamic terrorism, and Islamic violent extremism as ever-present threats to Western safety and ways of life. These violent ideologies and activities have, indeed, caused enormous bloodshed and destruction, affecting millions of civilians in the USA and abroad. However, the West’s fear of violent extremism, and the groundless of conflation of this violence with the religion of Islam itself, have also morphed into a troubling new crisis: a rise in Islamophobia. Defined as fear and suspicion of those who are or are perceived to be Muslim or belonging to the Islamic faith, Islamophobia is based on a false equivalency of violent extremism with Islamic religion and culture as a whole. In recent years, Islamophobia has created an environment of ambient hostility toward the law-abiding majority of Muslim American, Muslims in the West, and in Afghanistan who would otherwise be key allies in the fight against violent extremism. From anti-Islamic rhetoric, to racial profiling, to Koran burnings, the litany of Islamophobic narratives, policies, and events of the past twenty years have been undermining the US initiatives for countering violent extremist (CVE) and its efforts at counterterrorism & counterinsurgency efforts both domestically and

abroad. For the two decades since 9/11, the USA has been waging a Global War on Terror to counter violent extremism worldwide. Over time, the war has mushroomed into a conflict of a unique nature and unprecedented scale, wherein US policymakers and military leaders have attempted to defeat violent extremism by gaining the support of the local people most affected by it, a strategy known as “winning hearts and minds” (WHAM). According to this soft power strategy, the best way to conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations is to cultivate support among the local communities. This is done by showcasing that the USA and its allies have the community’s best interests at heart so that those same communities will contribute to the effort. The WHAM strategy depends upon the development and maintenance of harmonious cross-cultural relationships between the USA and its Muslim allies. It is also the most promising route to achieving a stable peace in Afghanistan. However, Islamophobia among Americans and their allies has eroded relationships with local Muslim communities in Afghanistan, as well as with many of the 1.8 billion Muslims worldwide. Whether intentional or not, incidents and policies perceived as Islamophobic, when perpetrated by Western governments, media, and civilians, alienate and sometimes radicalize crucial Muslim allies. Islamophobic incidents have led to discrimination, harassment, and even threats and physical attacks against Muslims, thereby stigmatizing and endangering millions of peaceful, law-abiding Muslim Americans and Muslims worldwide. Over the past two decades, Islamophobia has continued to spread, despite ample statistics and studies supporting the view that Muslims are as good and as law-abiding of citizens as anyone else. Islamophobia directly undermines the effort of the USA and its allies to win hearts and minds and stabilize Afghanistan. Islamophobia has exacerbated the war by spreading false and divisive narratives that compromise efforts by policymakers and practitioners. Through the spread of these poisonous narratives and the events they set in motion, Islamophobia poses a direct threat to the success of CVE strategies and efforts in the War on Terror. Violent extremist groups in Afghanistan leverage evidence of Islamophobia to frighten Afghan villagers into compliance, portraying US and NATO forces as blasphemous, anti-Muslim invaders who threaten the Afghan people’s religion and their very way of life. In the West, similar perceptions weaken domestic programs aimed at countering violent extremism, as these programs rely on cooperation with local Muslim communities. The spread of Islamophobia since 9/11 has not only hindered US efforts in the Global War on Terror; it has also created direct harm for the large part of the global population who are or are perceived to be Muslim. From mistreatment to outright attacks, the effects of Islamophobia exacerbate a broader sense of Muslim alienation from the rest of society. Recent polls indicate that large numbers of Muslim Americans are subjected to discrimination, suspicion, and even physical threats and attacks based on their religion. Many Muslims have come to feel as if they are outcasts, expressing stress and wariness about their livelihood and well-being within the USA. The sense of constant suspicion erodes relationships between the Muslim community and the non-Muslim USA and, ironically, provides a motive for friendly Muslims to become radicalized. Muslims’ devotion to defending their faith is then exploited by violent extremists within terrorist organizations, who recruit

previously friendly Muslims into their cause. In this way, Islamophobia fuels these extremists’ cause by amplifying ordinary Muslims’ sense of being under threat and driving them into the fold of the violent extremists

### ALT – Rethink Approach to Islam

#### The Alternative is to reject the Aff and rethink our approach to Islamic taqwa – Only a shift away from NATO’s inherent Islamophobic rhetoric can restructure the extremist threat It solves for the affs desire of security

Farhadi 20, - Adib Farhadi is an assistant professor at University of South Florida and coordinator of USF's Executive Education Program. August 6 2020 “Countering Violent Extremism by Winning Hearts and Minds” https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-030-50057-3.pdf, Accessed 7-19-2022, LASA-BF)

This book argues that we ought to take all forms of Islamophobia seriously. Too often,

Americans respond to the fear of an impending terror attack by turning on our own. But

if the United States continues to leave 3.5 million Americans vulnerable to hate and

prejudice, national security can never be fully established, and the core narrative of

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and counterradicalization will be undermined.

Islamophobia directly and indirectly hinders the efforts of the United States and its

allies to develop strong ties with the local and global Muslim population that are critical

to achieving durable peace in Afghanistan and advancing the U.S.’s position in the

Great Powers Competition. The goal of violent extremists is not only to combat the U.

S. and NATO militarily, but also to undermine the perception of cohesion within

Western society. By creating an “us-versus-them” mentality between Westerners and

Muslims, they hope to lure people into their cause for retribution. Therefore, the

approach to combatting violent extremists should also involve undermining their

narrative and winning the support of local communities. Fostering cooperation and

supplying the communities with necessities can help prevent additional violent

extremist groups from arising and recruiting new members. Given that the U.S. and

NATO forces have unintentionally offended local communities, it would be in the best

interest of coalition forces to recruit members of the communities and those who are

knowledgeable of the values of the local and neighboring communities. Creating social

integration domestically will also be paramount to our efforts in Islamic nations.

Because the narrative of inclusivity is the only narrative that can defeat the narrative

of alienation and separation that is promoted by violent extremists, there can be no

room for any form of discrimination from the West or coalition forces. Any tinge of

Islamophobia, whether direct or perceived, puts the narrative of inclusivity at risk and

undermines the victims of 9/11, the efforts and treasury put into the war, and the blood

and sacrifices of each soldier who has fought to uphold freedom and democracy. When

negativity is broadcast, whether via national leadership, mass media coverage, social

media, or Hollywood, and whether by private individuals or organizations, it fuels the

narratives of violent extremists, who exploit them to their advantage and claim that

these actions are America’s and the West’s true intentions. The propagandists strategically attempt to create the discord and division using various media as a megaphone

to amplify the message that the U.S. and the West are out to destroy Islam and its way

of life. Respecting American Muslims and protecting their civil rights is not only the right

thing to do; it is also in line with our espoused American values and demonstrates to the

world that we live up to our values of respecting religious freedom and embracing all

law-abiding people. Embracing law-abiding Muslims refutes the claims of extremist

propaganda. In a sense, the aggregate violent extremists’ movements might be considered a form of global insurgency that can only be countered through positive relationships between the U.S. Government and Muslim communities, both domestically and internationally. Insurgents work by attempting to delegitimize the opposing government, and the easiest way to destroy the credibility of the U.S. government is to create the perception of hypocrisy (Headquarters Department of the Army 2006). If we fail to support and enforce the civil rights of American Muslims simply because of ethnic or religious differences, then we are seen as hypocrites who cannot be trusted.

Perhaps we should instead take a hard and practical look at what bureaucracy, money, military, and programs can never accomplish: inclusiveness, relationship-building, partnership, knowledge-sharing, appreciation, creativity, collaboration, dignity, respect, empathy, and equality. Effective relationships are made possible through understanding, respect, and mutual trust.